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THE FRESH START CANON*
Jonathon S. Byington**
Abstract
A primary policy of bankruptcy law is to give consumer debtors a
“fresh start” by discharging their debt. A rival policy is that the discharge
of debt is a selectively conferred privilege that is not granted in some
situations. For example, society is unwilling to pardon debt related to
embezzlement or a domestic-support obligation. This “discharge
restrictions” policy is manifested in part by the Bankruptcy Code’s
exceptions to discharge. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized the tension between the fresh start and discharge restriction
policies. It has sought to achieve a fair balance between these policies by
applying a “plainly expressed” standard when interpreting exceptions to
discharge. Surprisingly, the circuit courts have not followed the Supreme
Court. Instead, nearly every circuit court has developed a practice of
construing exceptions to discharge narrowly in favor of the debtor and
against the creditor. This Article highlights this established practice and
seeks to challenge it. In essence, the circuit courts have transformed the
fresh start policy into a canon of construction when interpreting
exceptions to discharge. This Article makes three contributions. First, it
identifies and evaluates the circuit courts’ use of the fresh start policy as
a canon of construction. Second, it analyzes Supreme Court jurisprudence
and finds an established pattern rejecting the fresh start canon when
interpreting exceptions to discharge. Third, it explores the purpose and
nature of exceptions to discharge and argues the fresh start canon is an
unsuitable tool for interpreting them.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law has wildly competing policies. A primary one is the
“fresh start.”1 The fresh start provides relief to a debtor. It gives a debtor
“a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”2 The
Bankruptcy Code implements the fresh start through several different

1. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (noting that “[t]he
principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to ‘the honest but unfortunate
debtor’” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991))).
2. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating the fresh start policy is a
“public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt” (emphasis omitted)).
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sections, but it is primarily accomplished by discharging a debtor’s debt.3
Yet, the fresh start has limits.
A rival policy is that discharge of debt is a selectively conferred
privilege and therefore has restrictions. The Bankruptcy Code manifests
the “discharge restrictions” policy through provisions that deny a debtor
a discharge altogether under § 727(a) or except specific, individual debts
from discharge under § 523(a).4 Some of the exceptions to discharge are
based on the debt’s importance to society, such as taxes or domesticsupport obligations.5 Other exceptions to discharge are based on
reprehensible conduct by a debtor, such as embezzlement or fraud.6
Litigation over exceptions to discharge is one of the main
battlegrounds for determining the scope of a debtor’s fresh start. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized the tension between the fresh start and
discharge restriction policies. It has sought to achieve “a fair balance
between these conflicting interests.”7 To implement this balance, the
Supreme Court has a “‘well-known’ guide”8 and “long-standing
principle”9 that “exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those
plainly expressed.’”10
The circuit courts have not followed the Supreme Court’s mandate
when interpreting exceptions to discharge. Instead, nearly every circuit
court has developed a practice of construing exceptions to discharge
narrowly in favor of the debtor and against the creditor.11 This Article
seeks to highlight this established practice and to challenge it. In essence,
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727, 944, 1141, 1228, 1328 (2012). For example, § 727(b)
provides that “a discharge under subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts
that arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”
4. Id. §§ 523(a), 727(a).
5. Id. § 523(a)(1), (5).
6. Id. § 523(a)(2), (4).
7. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
8. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558,
562 (1915)).
9. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013).
10. Id. (quoting Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62).
11. Okla. Dep’t of Sec. v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying
§ 523(a)(19)); Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 66–68 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying
§ 523(a)(4)); Bos. Univ. v. Mehta, 310 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying § 523(a)(8));
Owens v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying § 523(a)(2)); McCrory
v. Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)); Meyers v. I.R.S. (In
re Meyers), 196 F.3d 622, 624 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying § 523(a)(1)); Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Jackson (In re Jackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying § 523(a)(1)); Foley &
Lardner v. Biondo (In re Biondo), 180 F.3d 126, 130 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying § 523(a)(2)); In re
Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying § 523(a)(15)); Hudson v. Raggio &
Raggio, Inc. (In re Hudson), 107 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying § 523(a)(5)); Equitable
Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying § 523(a)(2)). The
District of Columbia Circuit and Federal Circuit have not addressed the issue.
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the circuit courts have transformed the fresh start policy into a canon of
construction when interpreting exceptions to discharge. In other areas of
the Bankruptcy Code, it may be appropriate for courts to use the fresh
start policy as a canon of construction to promote one of the main
purposes of bankruptcy law. However, because of the purpose and nature
of exceptions to discharge, the fresh start policy should not be “elevated
to the level of interpretative trump card” over the policy of the discharge
restrictions.12
Part I of this Article explores the diverse and sometimes competing
rationales of bankruptcy law’s fresh start policy. It then examines how
the Supreme Court has balanced the tension between the fresh start and
discharge restrictions policies. Part II describes the purpose and use of
canons of construction and then analyzes the circuit courts’ use of the
fresh start policy as a substantive canon of construction. It argues the
Supreme Court has rejected the fresh start canon when interpreting
exceptions to discharge. It also considers why the purpose and nature of
exceptions to discharge makes the fresh start canon an unsuitable
interpretative tool. This Article concludes by recommending courts stop
using the fresh start canon to interpret exceptions to discharge.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part highlights the rationales of the fresh start policy and how
the Supreme Court has balanced the tension between it and the discharge
restrictions policy.
A. The Mixed Rationales of the Bankruptcy Fresh Start Policy
The fresh start policy is preeminent in consumer bankruptcy law.13
Although there are several provisions directly implementing it,14 the term
“fresh start” appears only once in the actual text of the Bankruptcy

12. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 (1995) (interpreting § 523(a)(2)(A) and rejecting an
argument based on a canon of construction that involved a negative implication or “negative
pregnant” that an “express statutory requirement here, contrasted with statutory silence there,
shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified instance”).
13. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (explaining that
“[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but
unfortunate debtor’” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991))); ELIZABETH
WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 6 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 7th ed.
2014) (stating that “[c]omparatively, the United States has always been, and remains, more
committed to the fresh start idea for consumers who file bankruptcy than any other country in the
world”); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial
Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 529 (1991) (stating that
“[t]he soul of debtor financial relief” is the “fresh start”).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 522, 524, 525, 727, 944, 1141, 1228, 1322, 1325, 1328 (2012).
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Code.15 It is hidden in a rare and infrequently used section of Chapter 15
that relates to proceedings in which a United States court assists a foreign
court that has primary bankruptcy jurisdiction over a foreign debtor.16 It
states:
In determining whether to provide additional assistance
under this title or under other laws of the United States, the
court shall consider whether such additional assistance,
consistent with the principles of comity, will reasonably
assure—
....
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh
start for the individual that such foreign proceeding
concerns.17
Despite its minuscule textual appearance, the significance of the fresh
start policy to consumer debtors is not seriously questioned.18
The Supreme Court began recognizing the fresh start policy by name
as early as 1885.19 The “fresh start” is about providing relief to “the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and it permits
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes.”20
Different aspects of bankruptcy law seek to implement the fresh start.
The automatic stay gives debtors their first sigh of relief by providing an
immediate reprieve from efforts of creditors to collect debt.21 Exemptions
allow debtors to retain and use set amounts and types of their property
during and after bankruptcy.22 Some debtors readjust their outstanding
15. Id. § 1507(b)(5).
16. See id. § 1502.
17. Id. § 1507(b) (emphasis added).
18. See Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1.01 (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th rev. ed. 2015) (“Bankruptcy serves to mitigate the effects of financial
failure. . . . For debtors who are individuals, [the Bankruptcy Code] provides the possibility of a
fresh start through the bankruptcy discharge . . . .”); WARREN ET AL., supra note 13, at 306 (stating
that “while there is no serious challenge in this country to the fundamental idea of the discharge
of debt, there has been hot debate over its scope”).
19. Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 541 (1885) (“The policy of the bankrupt act was, after
taking from the bankrupt all his property not exempt by law, to discharge him from his debts and
liabilities, and enable him to take a fresh start.”).
20. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915); see also Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (providing that a petition filed operates as a stay of various
enumerated acts).
22. See id. § 522.
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debt and payment schedules through a judicially confirmed plan of
reorganization.23 Crucially, bankruptcy courts commonly grant debtors a
discharge of debt and enjoin creditor efforts to collect discharged debt.24
There is also a prohibition of discrimination against individuals that are or
have been debtors in bankruptcy.25 These examples show the variety of
ways bankruptcy law provides debtors a fresh start.
Scholars have put forth a mixed variety of theories in support of the
fresh start. The theories are not necessarily harmonious.26 A basic theory
suggests that the fresh start preserves social order and peace.27 This
rationale is closely related to the modern societal view that, taken alone,
nonpayment of debt does not justify debtor imprisonment.28 Another
23. See id. §§ 1322, 1325.
24. See id. §§ 524, 727, 944, 1141, 1228, 1328.
25. See id. § 525; see also Douglass G. Boshkoff, Fresh Start, False Start, or Head Start?,
70 IND. L.J. 549, 549 (1995) (describing bankruptcy law’s tripartite protection for individual
debtors).
26. See Rafael Efrat, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy in Modern Day Israel, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 555, 558 (1999) (stating that “[t]he fresh-start policy has various
fundamental concerns and objectives”); Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV.
49, 96 (1986) (observing that “the idea of the ‘fresh start’ has long incorporated and been shaped
by a complex multiplicity of policy concerns”); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1048 (1987) (noting that “a number of different,
sometimes mutually inconsistent, policies have developed to justify isolated aspects of the
Bankruptcy Code’s discharge rules”).
27. SIMONE WEIL, On Bankruptcy, in SELECTED ESSAYS 1934–1943, at 145, 149 (Richard
Rees trans., 1962); see also RICHARD H. BELL, SIMONE WEIL: THE WAY OF JUSTICE AS
COMPASSION 59 (1998).
A rapid glance at history is enough to show the subversive role consistently
played, ever since money existed, by the phenomenon of debt. The cancellation
of debts was the principal feature of reforms of both Solon and Lycurgus. And
later on the small Greek cities were more than once shattered by movements in
favour of another cancellation. The revolt by which the Roman plebeians won
the institution of the tribuneship had its origin in a widespread insolvency which
was reducing more and more debtors to the condition of slavery; and even if there
had been no revolt a partial cancellation of debts had become imperative, because
with every plebeian reduced to a slave Rome lost a soldier.
The payment of debts is necessary for social order. The non-payment of
debts is quite equally necessary for social order.
WEIL, supra, at 149.
28. In early America, debtor prisons were prevalent. After the year 1830, there was a
general movement for the relief of debtors and states began prohibiting imprisonment for debt.
See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 256–57 (1974); JOSEPH D. FAY, A
DISQUISITION ON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT: AS THE PRACTICE EXISTS IN THE STATE OF NEW-YORK
18 (1818); THOMAS HERTTELL, REMARKS ON THE LAW OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT 67 (1823); Jay
Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge
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theory advocates that society has a responsibility to treat its members
humanely and promote values of human dignity and self-respect.29 In
addition, some have argued that the fresh start promotes the physical and
mental health of debtors.30
Another theory asserts that the fresh start has rehabilitative purposes,
incentivizing individual debtors to remain economically productive, thus
contributing to society.31 Some believe that it may also decrease a
in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 153–54 (1982); Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25
MICH. L. REV. 24, 32 (1926); Jason J. Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A
Radical Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 872 (2003); Frank T.
Carlton, Note, Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt in the United States, 17 YALE REV. 339, 339–
40 (1908). For a related but different discussion on why the Bankruptcy Clause was inserted in
the Constitution, see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).
29. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM 102–03 (1997); F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 200 (1918) (“The history of these [bankruptcy]
laws is evidence of man’s humanity to his fellow man.”); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy:
Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 515, 525, 536 (1991) (explaining that the moral approach of the fresh start “stresses
that human dignity is of a higher value than the economic benefits or costs associated with
achieving a desired economic result” and that “discharge [of debt] is an acknowledgment by
Congress that the dignity of the individual person has value”); Karen Gross, The Debtor as
Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 200
(1990) (stating the fresh start is based on social, religious, and philosophical values); Kilborn,
supra note 28, at 863 (evaluating a “mercy” theme of bankruptcy law and stating that “discharging
the debtor from a crushing debt burden is simply the morally just reaction to the suffering of
honest but unfortunate people[;] [m]orality and basic humanity call for the law to show
compassion and provide mercy to the pointlessly suffering debtor” (footnotes omitted)); Charles
Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the
Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 95 (1990) (stating “it is humane to free
hopelessly indebted individuals from their debts”).
30. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 560–61 (2002); see also Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s
Worry? Debt Management in Financially Distressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS
THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 142–46 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (discussing the physical and mental
effects of bankruptcy, including stress, insomnia, and depression).
31. See Kilborn, supra note 28, at 877 (“The thrust of the rehabilitation theme . . . has always
been not so much compassion for debtors hopelessly overwhelmed by crushing debt, but rather
the loss to society due to such debtors’ lack of incentive to work to earn a living or to acquire
property.”); John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 405, 412 (“[S]ociety as a whole also loses when moping bankrupt debtors are distracted
from working at their highest and best-use level of productivity because they are instead coping
with financial ruin.”); Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the State
Police Power, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 403, 410 (noting that “for the economic system as a whole,
discharge might be justified as preserving incentives that a debtor might otherwise lose if his debts
essentially mortgaged his future earnings”); Tabb, supra note 29, at 94 (stating that “freeing the
debtor from past debts encourages the debtor to become (or resume being) a productive member
of the commercial society”); William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection
System, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 1047, 1100 (“[A] debtor can become so overburdened with debt, and
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debtor’s reliance upon public welfare programs for support.32 Others
point out that the fresh start reassures individuals deciding to assume
financial risk, such as engaging in business activities, by providing an
alternative to life-long financial failure and debt servitude.33 In addition,
some have said it serves a social-insurance function.34
Although it is a bit of a paradox, a historical purpose of the fresh start
was to increase assets available for distribution to creditors by giving
debtors a discharge to incentivize them to cooperate.35 Another theory is
can anticipate such a lengthy period of subsistence living while disposable earnings are used
mostly for debt retirement, that he or she loses incentive to exploit personal skills productively.
Discharge of debt . . . promotes wealth maximization through realization of human skills.”
(footnote omitted)).
32. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the “Fresh Start,”
45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 207 (1994) (“Without the discharge, a hopelessly insolvent debtor would
lose her incentive to produce, preferring instead . . . administratively costly welfare benefits.”);
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1402
(1985) (predicting that “[i]f there were no right of discharge, an individual who lost his assets to
creditors might rely instead on social welfare programs”).
33. See Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 64 (1986) (noting the
fresh start encourages engagement of business risks); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and
Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 125 (1990) (stating that the bankruptcy discharge
“encourages beneficial, albeit risky, business activity by merchants and manufacturers”); Iain
Ramsay, Models of Consumer Bankruptcy: Implications for Research and Policy, 20 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 269, 278 (1997) (“Bankruptcy may also be a safety net for financial
consequences associated with changes in employment opportunities, family breakup, failure as an
entrepreneur, and may be a side-effect of accidents or illness.”); Doug R. Rendleman, The
Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723, 726 (1980) (observing that
discharge of debt “encourages people to take risks by removing some of failure’s permanent
sting”).
34. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 13, at 308 (stating that “the bankruptcy discharge
insures a residual class of ‘uninsurable’ disaster”); Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 592 (2000) (stating that “[a]
bankruptcy discharge provides the borrower with partial wage insurance”); Adam Feibelman,
Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
129, 160 (2005) (stating that “bankruptcy serves the same social insurance functions as
unemployment insurance, Medicare, disability insurance, workers’ compensation, and spousal
support laws”).
35. See Discussion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 123, 148 (1977)
(“[D]ischarge was a reward offered by the creditors to the debtors for assembling their property
and not concealing anything . . . . It was thought to be a benefit to the creditors.”); Hillman, supra
note 33, at 109–10 (“Some evidence suggests that discharge was primarily aimed at facilitating
debt collection by inducing debtors to cooperate in the collection process, not at rehabilitating
unfortunate merchant debtors.”); Howard, supra note 26, at 1049 (explaining that the original
intent of the discharge was to encourage debtors to cooperate in the distribution of their assets to
creditors); Tabb, supra note 29, at 90 (“The debtor cooperation theory justifies the discharge as
a carrot dangled in front of debtors to induce them to cooperate with the trustee and the creditors
in the bankruptcy case in the location, collection, and liquidation of the debtor’s assets.”).
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that society desires not only to protect individuals from their own
uncontrolled overconsumption of credit but also to protect others from
the resultant externalities.36 Some have argued that the fresh start
promotes efficient allocation of risk of loss between the debtor and
creditor, but there is a debate on which party is in a better position to
protect itself against the risk of nonpayment.37 Another theory is that
because the fresh start increases creditor losses, it incentivizes creditors
to monitor themselves in granting or withholding credit—a creditorenforced check on debtors.38 As this brief summary of the variety of
rationales shows, there is not a single, unified theory sustaining the fresh
start policy. Regardless of its many rationales, the significance of the
fresh start policy to bankruptcy law is unequivocal.
B. The Supreme Court Uses a “Plainly Expressed” Standard to
Maintain a Fair Balance Between the Policies of the Fresh Start and
the Discharge Restrictions
Despite its significance, the fresh start principle is not the sole policy
of bankruptcy law. When interpreting exceptions to discharge, the
Supreme Court has historically recognized both the fresh start and
discharge restrictions policies, often alternating between reliance upon
one or the other. This Section summarizes, in chronological order,
Supreme Court decisions that interpret exceptions to discharge. The
decisions construe various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,39

36. Jackson, supra note 32, at 1447.
37. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 981
(1981) (arguing that “[a] discharge system provides a technique for allocating the risk of financial
distress between a debtor and his creditors”); Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg’s
Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327, 362–63 (1982) (suggesting that creditors
may be in a better position to bear risk); Hillman, supra note 33, at 126 (stating that “debtors are
in control of their financial activities and therefore are arguably in a better position to predict and
avoid financial collapse or to insure against it”); Howard, supra note 26, at 1048 (arguing that
“bankruptcy may be designed to achieve economic efficiency in its allocation of the risk of loss,
connected with nonpayment, between debtor and creditor”); A. Charlene Sullivan, Reply:
Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (stating that debtors are
in a better position to bear risk of loss, as “risk of bankruptcy for an individual could be largely a
function of personal characteristics that creditors are not particularly adept at evaluating”).
38. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 1426 (“Discharge . . . heightens creditors’ incentives to
monitor: by providing for a right of discharge, society enlists creditors in the effort to oversee the
individual’s credit decisions even when the individual has not fully mortgaged his future. The
availability of the right of discharge induces creditors to restrict the individual’s credit intake and
thus to ensure that he does not seriously underestimate his future needs.” (footnote omitted)). But
see Pottow, supra note 31, at 409 (arguing that certain creditors use reckless lending practices).
39. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
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the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,40 the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,41 and
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005.42
Some of the earliest opinions focused on the fresh start policy. In
1877, the Supreme Court construed an exception to discharge in a manner
“consistent with the object and intention of Congress in enacting a
general law by which the honest citizen may be relieved from the burden
of hopeless insolvency. A different construction would be inconsistent
with the liberal spirit which pervades the entire bankrupt system.”43 In
1884, the Supreme Court observed that “[p]erhaps the liberal construction
made in favor of the certificate of discharge in this country is due to the
peculiar modes and habits of business prevailing amongst our people.”44
Yet the Supreme Court did not adopt a judicial preference solely in
favor of the fresh start policy. In 1904, it took a “natural and grammatical
reading”45 in one case and expressly declined a narrow construction in
another:
We are not inclined to place such a narrow construction
upon the language of the exception [to discharge]. We do not
think the language used was intended to limit the exception
in any such way. It was an honest debtor and not a malicious
wrongdoer that was to be discharged.46

40. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
41. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. (2012)).
42. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
43. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (interpreting the term fraud under § 33 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867); see also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934)
(construing § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in the same manner and holding that “[t]he scope
of the exception was to be limited accordingly”).
44. Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U.S. 676, 683 (1884) (stating that “[i]t is, no doubt, true, as
said in Chapman v. Forsyth, that a construction of the excepting clauses which would make them
include debts arising from agencies and the like, would leave but few debts on which the law
could operate”).
45. Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 189–90 (1904) (construing § 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898).
46. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 488–89 (1904) (construing the term “malice” in § 17
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). But cf. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978) (stating “willful” means
“deliberate or intentional to the extent that [Tinker] held that a less strict standard is intended, and
to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they
are overruled”), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 365
(1977) (stating “willful” means “deliberate or intentional to the extent that [Tinker] held that a
looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a
‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled” (footnote omitted)), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320–21.
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In 1915, the Supreme Court established the foundational principle for
interpreting exceptions to discharge. It held: “In view of the well-known
purposes of the Bankrupt Law exceptions to the operation of a discharge
thereunder should be confined to those plainly expressed . . . .”47 A year
later, the Supreme Court again rejected a request for a narrow
construction of an exception to discharge.48
In 1920, the Supreme Court noted the purpose of exceptions to
discharge “was to limit more narrowly the effect of a discharge by
enlarging the class of provable debts that were to be excepted from it”
and that it was “designed to restrict the scope of a discharge in
bankruptcy.”49 In 1964, the Supreme Court elaborated on the rationale of
the discharge restrictions policy and how it relates to the fresh start:
Nor is petitioner aided by the now-familiar principle that one
main purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to let the honest
debtor begin his financial life anew . . . . [The exceptions to
discharge section] is not a compassionate section for debtors.
Rather, it demonstrates congressional judgment that certain
problems—e.g., those of financing government—override
the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start. Congress
clearly intended that personal liability for unpaid tax debts
survive bankruptcy. The general humanitarian purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act provides no reason to believe that Congress
had a different intention with regard to personal liability for
the interest on such debts.50
In 1978, the Supreme Court was divided on how to interpret an
exception to discharge dealing with liability for taxes.51 Justice William
Rehnquist wrote on behalf of four dissenters, stating: “I would hesitate to
depart from our longstanding tradition of reading the Bankruptcy Act
with an eye to its fundamental purpose—the rehabilitation of bankrupts.
This has always led the Court, at least until today, to construe narrowly
any exceptions to the general discharge provisions.”52 Justice Rehnquist’s
47. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 558, 562 (1915) (interpreting the term “property” in
§ 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended).
48. See McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 141–42 (1916) (interpreting the term
“injury” in § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). The Court held: “We are not inclined to place
such a narrow construction upon the language of the exception. We do not think the language
used was intended to limit the exception in any such way. It was an honest debtor and not a
malicious wrongdoer that was to be discharged.” Id. at 142 (quoting Tinker, 193 U.S. at 488–89).
49. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 252–53 (1920).
50. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (footnote omitted) (interpreting an
exception to discharge dealing with debts due as a tax to include post-petition interest).
51. See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 285–86 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(interpreting § 17a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
52. Id. at 285–86.
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dissent characterizing prior decisions as “always” construing exceptions
to discharge narrowly seems strained.53 While the majority opinion
recognized the importance of the fresh start policy, it focused on the
purpose of the discharge restrictions:
And while it is true that a finding of nondischargeability
prevents a bankrupt from getting an entirely ‘fresh start,’ this
observation provides little assistance in construing a section
expressly designed to make some debts nondischargeable.
We are not here concerned with the entire Act’s policy, but
rather with what Congress intended in § 17a(1) and its
subdivision (e).54
The majority went on to reject a narrow interpretation of the exception to
discharge relating to taxes.55
In 1986, the Supreme Court again rejected a narrow interpretation of
an exception to discharge.56 In 1991, it held that the standard of proof for
all discharge exceptions is the ordinary preponderance of the evidence
standard.57 The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning “that the general
‘fresh start’ policy that undergirds the Bankruptcy Code militated in favor
of a broad construction favorable to the debtor.”58 It also rejected the
argument that the clear and convincing standard was required to
effectuate the fresh start policy, reasoning that it was
53. See Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915) (stating “exceptions to the operation of
a discharge [] should be confined to those plainly expressed”), and McIntyre, 242 U.S. at 142
(stating “[w]e are not inclined to place such a narrow construction upon the language of the
exception [to discharge]”).
54. Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 279–80.
55. Id. at 275 (holding that respondent’s liability, although called a “penalty” under I.R.C.
§ 6672, was a “tax” as that term is used in § 17(a)(1)).
56. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986) (holding that a criminal restitution order
was within the scope of the phrase “to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss” in the Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978). “Kelly analyzed the purposes of restitution in
construing the qualifying clauses of § 523(a)(7), which explicitly tie the application of that
provision to the purpose of the compensation required.” Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 559 (1990) (evaluating and distinguishing the Kelly decision to interpret the defined
term “debt” in the Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978).
57. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 291 (1991) (rejecting the argument that the clearand-convincing standard applies).
58. Id. at 283; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69–70 (1995) (rejecting a narrow
construction to an exception to discharge and stating that “[w]here Congress uses terms that have
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms”
(alterations in original) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739
(1989))).
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unlikely that Congress, in fashioning the standard of proof
that governs the applicability of these provisions, would
have favored the interest in giving perpetrators of fraud a
fresh start over the interest in protecting victims of fraud.
Requiring the creditor to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that his claim is not dischargeable reflects a fair
balance between these conflicting interests.59
The Supreme Court continued:
The statutory provisions governing nondischargeability
reflect a congressional decision to exclude from the general
policy of discharge certain categories of debts . . . . Congress
evidently concluded that the creditors’ interest in recovering
full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the
debtors’ interest in a complete fresh start.60
In 1998, the Supreme Court rejected a “more encompassing
interpretation” by focusing on the words of the statute and held “[a]
construction so broad would be incompatible with the ‘well-known’
guide that exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those plainly
expressed.’”61 In a different case decided later that same month, the
Supreme Court rejected a narrow interpretation of an exception to
discharge because “the objective of ensuring full recovery by the creditor
would be ill served.”62 In 2013, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed that
its approach was “consistent with the longstanding principle that
‘exceptions to discharge “should be confined to those plainly
expressed.”’”63 In its most recent decision interpreting an exception to

59. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87.
60. Id. at 287.
61. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998) (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S.
558, 562 (1915)) (holding that § 523(a)(6)’s language of “willful and malicious injury by the
debtor” does not include a medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or reckless
conduct because “[t]he word ‘willful’ in (a)(6) modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that
nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional
act that leads to injury”).
62. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1998) (holding that § 523(a)(2)(A) prevents
the discharge of all liability arising from fraud and that an award of treble damages therefore falls
within the scope of the exception to discharge).
63. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013) (quoting Kawaauhau,
523 U.S. at 62). Bullock interpreted the term “defalcation” in § 523(a)(4) to include a culpable
state of mind requirement “involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the
improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.” Id. at 1757.
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discharge, the Supreme Court rejected the debtor’s request for a narrow
interpretation.64
In summary, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to interpret
exceptions to discharge narrowly. Instead, since the year 1915, the
Supreme Court has sought to balance the competing fresh start and
discharge restriction policies by interpreting exceptions to discharge
using a “plainly expressed” standard.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ USE OF THE FRESH START
POLICY AS A CANON OF CONSTRUCTION
The circuit courts do not use the “plainly expressed” standard when
interpreting exceptions to discharge. Instead, they have developed a
practice of construing exceptions to discharge narrowly in favor of the
debtor and against the creditor. In essence, the circuit courts have
transformed the fresh start policy into a canon of construction when
interpreting exceptions to discharge. This Part begins by reviewing the
role of canons of construction. It then labels the circuit courts’ use of the
fresh start policy a substantive canon and names it the “fresh start canon.”
It examines the components of the canon and highlights how it affects the
interpretation of exceptions to discharge. It argues that employing the
fresh start canon to interpret exceptions to discharge is misguided for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has rejected use of the fresh start canon
in the exceptions to discharge context. Second, the purpose and nature of
exceptions to discharge makes the fresh start canon an unsuitable
interpretative tool.
A. The Role of Canons
Canons are one of many sources courts use to determine the meaning
of statutory text. There are several different types of canons.
1. Sources of Guidance Courts Use to Decide the Meaning of
Statutory Text
A natural consequence of our adversarial legal system is that the
meaning of statutory text is often disputed. As Justice Frank Murphy
observed, “words are inexact tools at best.”65 Courts are commonly called

64. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016) (rejecting the debtor’s
argument that “Congress added the phrase ‘actual fraud’ to § 523(a)(2)(A) not to expand the
exception’s reach, but to restrict it” and interpreting the phrase “to encompass fraudulent
conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation”).
65. Harrison v. N. Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 476, 477, 479 (1943) (interpreting § 807 of the Revenue
Act of 1932).
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upon to decide what words mean.66 The analysis begins with a close
reading of the statute’s words.67 The words are usually given their
ordinary, common sense, or reasonable meaning, in the context in which
they are being used and applied.68 Earlier court opinions on the meaning
of statutory text may be binding or persuasive in deciding what words
mean.69
There are many different theoretical methods courts use to determine
meaning.70 The methods do not have clear boundaries and they are often
intermixed and modified.71 Depending upon the method of interpretation,
66. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (observing that “[t]hose
who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule” and it is
“the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”).
67. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (stating that “[i]n
ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole”); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (stating that the “starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself”).
68. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296 (1991) (focusing on the text of 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f)(1)); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain meaning of
legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 321, 355 (1990).
69. See NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:15, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (“Every statute is an independent
communication, for which either the intended or the understood meaning may be different, even
if the language is similar. For this reason, a decision on a point of statutory construction has little
relevance as precedent to construe any other statute, except where the language of one statute was
‘borrowed’ for another, or both statutes concern such closely related subjects that consideration
of one naturally brings the other to mind.” (footnote omitted)).
70. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 68, at 324 (“The three main theories today
emphasize (1) the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute
(‘intentionalism’); (2) the actual or presumed purpose of the statute (‘purposivism’ or ‘modified
intentionalism’); and (3) the literal commands of the statutory text (‘textualism’).”); see also Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205 (1980)
(examining “the three fundamental methods of originalism: interpretation of the text of the
Constitution, interpretation of the intentions of its adopters, and inference from the structure and
relationships of government institutions”).
71. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 318–50 (1986) (proposing a coherentist
approach to statutory interpretation); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533, 552 (1983) (proposing statutory construction “only when the statute either plainly addresses
a problem or requires someone else (judges or administrators) to supply their own solutions”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (proposing a reasonable reader framework); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (combining legislative
intent and the purpose of the statute in context of modern times and current views of the
legislature); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 68, at 353, 355 (proposing a practical reasoning
model of statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
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courts use a variety of sources to help guide them in determining the
meaning of statutory text.72 Courts occasionally look at statutes other than
the one being interpreted.73 Sometimes they use dictionaries.74 Courts
also look to legislative history, such as committee reports and the
transcripts of hearings and floor debates.75 At times, courts look to a
maxim, which is a traditional legal principle that has been frozen into a
concise expression, such as caveat emptor, meaning “let the buyer
beware.”76 Finally, courts regularly use canons as a source of authority to
draw inferences on the meaning of statutory text.77
REV. 621, 623–24 (1990) (arguing the Court has moved toward a more text-based approach to
interpretation); Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2012) (observing the Court prefers a simpler bright-line rule
over a complicated multifactor approach); John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911, 1912 (2015) (focusing on intent skepticism and the difficulty of identifying
congressional intent); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2393
(2003) (proposing a “contextual interpretation of statutory texts and a principled exercise of
judicial review” in an absurdity doctrine context); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.
REV. 347, 350 (2005) (preferring clear and predictable rules over judgmental standards); Damien
M. Schiff, Purposivism and the “Reasonable Legislator”: A Review Essay of Justice Stephen
Breyer’s Active Liberty, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1081, 1104 (2007) (book review) (proposing
“Blackstone Variant Textualism” as a new theory of interpretation); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning
Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 270 (proposing
linguists’ prototype theory for statutory interpretation).
72. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 69, § 45:13.
73. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978).
74. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 277 (1998); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 483, 486–87 (2013); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 77, 79 (2010); Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH
50, 50 (1993); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 228–29 (1999);
Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437
(1994).
75. See generally James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch
Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1226 (2010); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax
Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1262 (2009); Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann,
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22
JURIMETERICS J. 294, 304 (1982); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into
Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1131–32 (1983); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 442–43 (1988); David S. Law
& David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1658 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 410–11 (2004).
76. Caveat Emptor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
77. The Supreme Court has occasionally treated maxims and canons as synonyms. See
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (“The wording of § 1 calls for
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“[C]anons are not mandatory rules. They are guides that ‘need not be
conclusive.’”78 They are principles that suggest inferences on the
meaning of text. Scholars have mixed views on the utility and propriety
of using canons to interpret statutory text.79 Canons may be divided into
two fundamental groups: textual and substantive.
2. Textual Canons
80

Textual canons are predictive guidelines used to determine
legislative intent based on word choice, grammatical configuration, or the
relationship between parts of the text.81 A classic example of a textual
canon is the Latin phrase expressio unius est exclusion alterius, meaning
the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.82 Textual canons
may be divided into several different subcategories, such as semantic
canons, syntactic canons, and contextual canons.83 Textual canons do not

the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon that ‘[w]here general words
follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’” (alteration
in original)); see also Canon of Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (stating that canons of
construction are principles that guide the interpreter of a text).
78. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (quoting Circuit City, 532
U.S. at 115); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (stating that canons of
construction “are simply ‘rules of thumb’ which will sometimes ‘help courts determine the
meaning of legislation’” (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992))).
79. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 65–66 (1994); Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401
(1950); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 672 (1992); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the
Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1202; James C. Thomas, Statutory
Construction When Legislation Is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 210
(1966); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 412 (1989).
80. This type of canon is also called “grammatical,” “language,” or “linguistic.”
81. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005) (explaining the difference between
language canons and substantive canons).
82. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (reasoning that “[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion” (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 729, 722 (5th Cir.
1972))).
83. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 69–239 (2012) (categorizing and explaining various canons).
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embody or further any specific substantive policy.84 Rather, they provide
a basis for a court to assign a specific meaning to statutory text.85
3. Substantive Canons
Substantive canons are not platitudes, but policy-based principles
expressed in a short-form summary. Sometimes they reflect judicially
preferred policy positions.86 Perhaps the most common substantive
canons are directives to interpret different types of statutes “liberally” or
“strictly.”87 For example, the Supreme Court has established a
substantive canon that the coverage of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 “must be broadly construed.”88 When interpreting penal statutes,
the substantive canon of the rule of lenity states ambiguous statutory text
should be construed narrowly in favor of the defendant.89
Leading scholars have observed that courts utilize substantive canons
in a variety of ways. “[S]ometimes courts will treat a substantive canon as
merely a tiebreaker that affects the outcome only if, at the end of the basic
interpretive process, the court is left unable to choose between the two
competing interpretations . . . .”90 Other times, courts “treat substantive
canons as presumptions that, at the beginning of the interpretive process,
set up a presumptive outcome, which can be overcome by persuasive
support” from a variety of sources.91 To overcome the presumption, an
opposing party may support a particular meaning by using sources such as
statutory text, legislative history, statutory purposes, or policy arguments.92
“[C]ourts may [also] treat substantive canons as clear statement rules,
which purport to compel a particular interpretive outcome unless there is a
clear statement to the contrary.”93
84. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 690 (5th ed. 2014).
85. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 81, at 12.
86. Id. at 13 (noting how readily canons can be used to defend contradictory results and
how they have been used to promote judicial policy preferences at the expense of evident
congressional intent).
87. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 69, at § 56:1 (stating “[p]ublic policy considerations
exert a significant influence in the process of judicial statutory interpretation” and that the rules
regarding strict and liberal interpretation are founded on public policy considerations).
88. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989). See
generally William Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001)
(providing examples of statutes that are interpreted liberally to advance their policies).
89. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (stating ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity); see also Lawrence M. Solan,
Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 119 (1998).
90. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 84, at 693 (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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B. The Fresh Start Policy as an Unlabeled Substantive Canon in the
Circuit Courts
As the old adage goes, if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and
quacks like a duck, it just may be a duck.94 In a similar fashion, the circuit
courts are using the fresh start policy as a substantive canon of
construction without calling it that. Instead, the circuit courts use labels
like “traditional[] interpret[ation],”95 “duty to construe,”96 and
“principle.”97 Despite this array of names, nearly every circuit court has
an established practice of using the fresh start policy as a substantive
canon of construction when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code’s
exceptions to discharge.98
This “fresh start canon” is worded differently throughout the circuits
but generally has three components. First, it expressly references the fresh
start by name and indicates the fresh start policy is one of the reasons the
court is construing statutory text a certain way. Second, it requires
exceptions to discharge be narrowly or strictly construed in favor of the
debtor. Finally, it requires statutory text be construed against the creditor.
Each component will be addressed in turn.
1. The Fresh Start Policy as a Basis for Construing Statutory Text
Circuit courts openly point to and rely upon the fresh start policy as a
basis for interpreting statutory text a certain way. For example, in the First
Circuit, “[e]xceptions to discharge are narrowly construed in furtherance
of the Bankruptcy Code’s ‘fresh start’ policy.”99 The Fourth Circuit has
observed that “[w]hen addressing exceptions to discharge, we
traditionally interpret the exceptions narrowly to protect the purpose of
providing debtors a fresh start.”100 The Eighth Circuit “construe[s]
94. United States v. Charnock (In re Charnock), 97 B.R. 619, 627 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
(“[I]f it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck, it has got to be a duck.”); In
re Glenn Elec. Sales Corp., 89 B.R. 410, 418 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (“Although I am not able to
cite the author, there is a saying to the effect that if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck then,
in all likelihood, it’s a duck.”).
95. Foley & Lardner v. Biondo (In re Biondo), 180 F.3d 126, 130 (4th Cir. 1999).
96. Owens v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002).
97. Fezler v. Davis (In re Davis), 194 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1999).
98. See cases cited supra note 11.
99. Century 21 Balfour Real Estate v. Menna (In re Menna), 16 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added) (applying § 523(a)(2)), modified by Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70–71 (1995);
see also Sauer Inc. v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying
§ 523(a)(2)); Richmond v. N.H. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, 542 F.3d 913, 917 (1st
Cir. 2008) (applying § 523(a)(7)); Rutanen v. Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying
§ 523(a)(4)).
100. In re Biondo, 180 F.3d at 130 (emphasis added) (applying § 523(a)(2)); see also Kubota
Tractor Corp. v. Strack (In re Strack), 524 F.3d 493, 497 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying § 523(a)(4)
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exceptions to discharge narrowly in order to effect the fresh start policy
of the Bankruptcy Code.”101 In the Ninth Circuit, “exceptions to
dischargeability should be strictly construed in order to preserve the
Bankruptcy Act’s purpose of giving debtors a fresh start.”102
These examples contain classic characteristics of a substantive canon.
They identify a distinct policy position by expressly naming the fresh
start policy. They also promote or express a preference for the identified
policy by using phrases such as “in furtherance of,” “to protect the
purpose of,” “in order to effect,” and “in order to preserve.”
Consequently, the fresh start policy is actively influencing the way circuit
courts interpret exceptions to discharge.
2. Construing Statutory Text in Favor of the Debtor
Another component of the fresh start canon is construing statutory text
in a way that favors the debtor. In the Second Circuit, “exceptions to
discharge are to be narrowly construed and genuine doubts should be
resolved in favor of the debtor.”103 The Tenth Circuit has held
“[e]xceptions to discharge are to be narrowly construed, and because of the
fresh start objectives of bankruptcy, doubt is to be resolved in the debtor’s
favor.”104 In the Eleventh Circuit, “courts generally construe the statutory
exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy ‘liberally in favor of the debtor,’ and
recognize that ‘[t]he reasons for denying a discharge . . . must be real and
substantial, not merely technical and conjectural.’”105
and (a)(6)); Nunnery v. Rountree (In re Rountree), 478 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying
§ 523(a)(2)).
101. In re Miller, 276 F.3d at 429 (emphasis added) (applying § 523(a)(2)); see also Geiger
v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 853 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying § 523(a)(2)), aff’d, 523
U.S. 57 (1998); Jennen v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying
§ 523(a)(2)).
102. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added) (quoting Industrie Aeronautiche E. Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio S.p.A. v.
Kasler (In re Kasler), 611 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1979)) (applying § 523(a)(1)); see also Hawkins
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 769 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying § 523(a)(1)); Ghomeshi v.
Sabban (In re Sabban), 600 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying § 523(a)(2)); Gregg v.
Rahm (In re Rahm), 641 F.2d 755, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying § 35(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898).
103. Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying § 523(a)(4)).
104. Okla. Dep’t. of Sec. v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Sandoval (In re Sandoval), 541 F.3d 997, 1001 (10th Cir. 2008))
(applying § 523(a)(19)); see John Deere Co. v. Gerlach (In re Gerlach), 897 F.2d 1048, 1052 (10th
Cir. 1990) (applying § 523(a)(2)); Driggs v. Black (In re Black), 787 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir.
1986) (applying § 523(a)(2) and (a)(4)), abrogated by Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991);
see also Bellco First Fed. Credit Union v. Kaspar (In re Kaspar), 125 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir.
1997) (applying § 523(a)(2)).
105. Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1994) (alterations
in original) (applying § 523(a)(2)); see also Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A. (In re Bullock),
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The way circuit courts interpret the words “fiduciary capacity” in the
exception to discharge in § 523(a)(4) provides an example of how the
fresh start canon influences what is inferred from statutory text. That
section relates to debt for “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity.”106 Circuit courts have found that “[c]onsistent with the
principle that exceptions to discharge are to be narrowly construed, the
concept of fiduciary under § 523(a)(4) is narrower than it is under the
general common law.”107 The influence of the fresh start canon has
resulted in surprising interpretations on the meaning of fiduciary
capacity, such as circuit courts holding that a debtor who was an attorney
in an attorney–client relationship was not acting in a fiduciary capacity,108
a debtor who was a fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act was not acting in a fiduciary capacity, 109 and a debtor who
670 F.3d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying § 523(a)(4)), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013);
Guerra v. Fernandez-Rocha (In re Fernandez-Rocha), 451 F.3d 813, 816 (11th Cir. 2006)
(applying § 523(a)(4)); First Nat’l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 932 (11th Cir.
1983) (applying § 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012); see also Jonathon S. Byington, The Challenges of the
New Defalcation Standard, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 10 (2014) (focusing on the challenges of
applying the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term defalcation in Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1756);
Jonathon S. Byington, Fiduciary Capacity and the Bankruptcy Discharge, 24 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (focusing on the meaning of “fiduciary capacity” in § 523(a)(4)).
107. Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. Tran (In re Tran), 151 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1998) (footnote
omitted); see also Double Bogey, L.P. v. Enea, 794 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that
“[w]e have adopted a narrow definition of ‘fiduciary’ for purposes of § 523(a)(4)” (quoting In re
Cantrell, 329 F.3d 119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003))); Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Blaszak (In re
Blaszak), 397 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating “[t]his Court construes the term ‘fiduciary
capacity’ found in the defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4) more narrowly than the term is used in
other circumstances”); In re Frain, 230 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he existence of a
‘fiduciary relationship’ is a matter of federal law. It bears emphasis that not all fiduciary
relationships qualify under the Bankruptcy Code.”); Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller),
156 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1998); Ragsdale v. Haller, 780 F.2d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
that “[t]he broad, general definition of fiduciary—a relationship involving confidence, trust and
good faith—is inapplicable”).
108. See Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1372 (10th Cir. 1996)
(concluding the attorney debtor and a creditor did not have a fiduciary relationship and stating
“[i]n cases where the debtor is an attorney and the creditor is the client, as we have here, the
majority of courts that have considered the issue have applied the above principles to require more
than an attorney–client relationship alone to establish a fiduciary relationship for purposes of
§ 523(a)(4)”), abrogated by Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). But see Andy Warhol Found. for
Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the attorney–
client relationship, without more, constitutes a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4)).
109. See Bd. of Trs. v. Bucci (In re Bucci), 493 F.3d 635, 643 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding an
ERISA fiduciary did not satisfy the fiduciary relationship required by § 523(a)(4)). But see Blyler
v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding “ERISA satisfies
the traditional requirements for a statutory fiduciary to qualify as a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4)”),
abrogated by Bullock, 133 S. Ct. 1754.
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was an obstetrician was not acting in a fiduciary capacity when he
negligently performed a procedure that blinded a baby in one eye while
the baby was in his mother’s womb.110 In § 523(a)(4), Congress did not
want to discharge debt owed to beneficiaries of a fiduciary debtor if the
debtor committed a defalcation.111 The foregoing examples show how
circuit courts are using the fresh start canon in a way that results in the
fresh start policy trumping the discharge restrictions policy. Ironically,
this outcome has developed in the context of courts interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code’s exceptions to discharge, which is the very code
section that Congress designed to implement the discharge restrictions
policy.112
Courts often have several different reasons for assigning a certain
meaning to statutory text. A recent case from the Fifth Circuit illustrates
that the fresh start canon’s pro-debtor preference is often included as one
of many explanations for a decision that favors the debtor, even if the
interpretation seems strained. Husky International Electronics, Inc. v.
Ritz (In re Ritz)113 involved the meaning of the words “actual fraud” in
§ 523(a)(2)(A).114 That section states a bankruptcy discharge does not
discharge debt obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud.”115
The bankruptcy court in Ritz made several findings of fact after it held
a trial and considered testimony from ten different witnesses. 116 It
determined that the debtor had financial control of the company117 and
110. See Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding a fiduciary capacity requires an express trust and that “[n]o such express trust arises out
of the doctor–patient relationship”).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
112. See Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (stating that the Bankruptcy
Code section containing the exceptions to discharge “demonstrates congressional judgment that
certain problems—e.g., those of financing government—override the value of giving the debtor a
wholly fresh start”).
113. 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
114. Id. at 316.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
116. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 459 B.R. 623, 629–30 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2011), aff’d, 513 B.R. 510 (2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312, rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1581. The bankruptcy
court identified whether a given witness’s testimony was given little or significant weight.
Notably, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor was not a credible witness and observed that
“his frequent inability to recall certain information was not coincidental” and “[h]is ability to
recollect was selective.” Id. at 629. It found the debtor’s explanation for certain fund transfers
“disingenuous, if not downright misleading” and that the debtor “frequently gave non-responsive
answers to questions which were unambiguous.” Id.
117. Id. at 627 (finding the debtor was the owner of at least thirty percent of the common
stock of Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp., that he was its director, and that he exercised financial
control of the corporation).
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that the company owed a creditor $163,999.118 The debtor caused the
company to transfer over one million dollars to various entities in which
the debtor held an ownership interest and the company did not receive
reasonably equivalent value for the transfers.119 The bankruptcy court
also found that the company was not paying its debts as they became due
and that its debts exceeded its assets.120 The bankruptcy court found that
as a result of the debtor’s fund transfers from the company’s account, the
creditor suffered damages totaling $163,999.121 It even concluded “the
[d]ebtor is not an upstanding businessman who can be trusted.”122
However, “[n]o exhibits were introduced and no testimony was adduced
indicating that the [d]ebtor made any oral or written representations to
the [creditor].”123
The issue came down to whether a representation was required for
“actual fraud” under § 523(a)(2)(A)’s language of “false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud.”124 The bankruptcy court analyzed the
requirements of actual fraud under Texas law and concluded that a
representation was a necessary element for establishing actual fraud.125 It
then found that the tests for fraud under Texas law and the requirements
of § 523(a)(2)(A) “are virtually the same” and held the creditor did not
prove actual fraud.126 The district court affirmed on appeal.127
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the creditor argued that a false
representation was unnecessary to trigger “actual fraud” under
§ 523(a)(2)(A).128 The creditor pointed to the Seventh Circuit case
118. Id.
119. Id. at 628.
120. Id. at 627–28.
121. Id. at 628. This finding is significant because § 523(a)(2)(A) states a discharge does not
discharge “any debt for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis
added).
122. In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 636.
123. Id. at 628.
124. Id. at 633; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
125. See In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 633.
126. Id.
127. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 513 B.R. 510, 539 (S.D. Tex. 2014), (“[T]he
Court agrees with Judge Bohm [of the bankruptcy court] that since there is no representation
involved in this Adversary Proceeding, [the creditor] fails to prevail under § 523(a)(2)(A) to
overturn the discharge of [the company’s] debt to [the creditor].”), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312, rev’d, 136
S. Ct. 1581. Interestingly, the district court quoted the fresh start canon that ‘“the basic principle
of bankruptcy that exceptions to discharge must be strictly construed against a creditor and
liberally construed in favor of a debtor so that the debtor may be afforded a fresh start.”’ Id. at
518 (quoting FNFS, Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood), 637 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir. 2011)).
128. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d,
136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
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McClellan v. Cantrell,129 which held actual fraud does not require a
representation.130 The McClellan court focused on the wording of
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and reasoned that “by distinguishing between ‘a false
representation’ and ‘actual fraud,’ the statute makes clear that actual
fraud is broader than misrepresentation.”131 The McClellan court
explained:
No learned inquiry into the history of fraud is necessary
to
establish
that
it
is
not
limited
to
misrepresentations . . . . “Fraud is a generic term, which
embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity
can devise and which are resorted to by one individual to
gain an advantage over another . . . . No definite and
invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition
defining fraud, and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is
cheated.”132
The Ritz court rejected the reasoning of McClellan and instead drew
pro-debtor inferences by holding “a representation is a necessary
prerequisite for a showing of ‘actual fraud’ under Section
523(a)(2)(A).”133 Although it based its reasoning on several grounds,134
the final justification given by the Ritz court was the fresh start canon,
that “[e]xceptions to discharge should be construed in favor of debtors in
accordance with the principle that provisions dealing with this subject are
remedial in nature and are designed to give a fresh start to debtors
unhampered by pre-existing financial burdens.”135 Even though the fresh
start canon was certainly not the exclusive reason the Ritz court
interpreted the exception to discharge in favor of the debtor, it was a
significant enough reason to be prominently included as the final
justification for the decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ritz and gave the statutory text a broader
reading, interpreting the term actual fraud “to encompass fraudulent

129. 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000).
130. Id. at 894 (concluding that a fraudulent misrepresentation “is not the only form that
fraud can take or the only form that makes a debt nondischargeable”).
131. Id. at 893.
132. Id. (quoting Stapleton v. Holt, 250 P.2d 451, 453–54 (Okla. 1952)).
133. See In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 321.
134. Some of the other grounds included the Ritz court’s interpretation of Field v. Mans, 516
U.S. 59, 70 (1995) and its own Fifth Circuit precedent in RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d
1284, 1293 (5th Cir. 1995). In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 317, 319.
135. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d at 321 (alteration in original) (quoting Fezler v. Davis (In re Davis),
194 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false
representation.”136
3. Construing Statutory Text Against the Creditor
The closely related third and final component of the fresh start canon
is construing statutory text against the creditor. If construing text in favor
of the debtor is one side of a coin, construing text against the creditor is
simply the other side of the same coin. In the Third Circuit, “statutory
exceptions to discharge are generally construed ‘narrowly against the
creditor and in favor of the debtor.’”137 In the Fifth Circuit, “exceptions
to discharge must be strictly construed against a creditor and liberally
construed in favor of a debtor so that the debtor may be afforded a fresh
start.”138 The Seventh Circuit construes exceptions to discharge “strictly
against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor in order
to give the debtor a better chance at a fresh start.”139
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of what an educational “loan”
means in § 523(a)(8) provides an example of construing words against
the creditor. Boston University v. Mehta (In re Mehta)140 involved a
student debtor who registered and took classes from a university without
paying.141 The debtor owed charges for delinquent tuition and attendant
costs.142 After the debtor filed bankruptcy, the creditor university argued
that the debtor’s “tuition debt arose from an extension of credit for
136. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz) 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016).
137. Bos. Univ. v. Mehta (In re Mehta), 310 F.3d. 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting In re
Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993)) (applying § 523(a)(8)).
138. Hudson v. Raggio & Raggio, Inc. (In re Hudson), 107 F.3d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1997)
(applying § 523(a)(5)); see also FNFS, Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood), 637 F.3d 615, 619 (5th
Cir. 2011) (applying § 523(a)(4)); Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Assocs. (In re M.M. Winkler &
Assocs.), 239 F.3d 746, 751 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying § 523(a)(2)); Hickman v. Texas (In re
Hickman), 260 F.3d 400, 404 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying § 523(a)(7)); LSP Inv. P’ship v. Bennett
(In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784–85 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying § 523(a)(4)); Citizens Bank &
Tr. Co. v. Case (In re Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that “[a]ny exception
to the general discharge of a debtor’s debts is strictly governed by the Code and construed
narrowly in favor of the debtor and against the creditor requesting the determination”) (applying
§ 523(a)(3)), superseded by statute, FED. R. APP. P. 3(c), as recognized in McDow v. United
Refuse LLC (In re United Refuse LLC), 171 F. App’x 426 (4th Cir. 2006); Boyle v. Abilene
Lumber, Inc. (In re Boyle), 819 F.2d 583, 588 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying § 523(a)(4)), superseded
in part by statute, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.031 (West 2016), as recognized in Ratliff ReadyMix v. Pledger (In re Pledger), 592 F. App’x 296 (5th Cir. 2015); Murphy & Robinson Inv. Co.
v. Cross (In re Cross), 666 F.2d 873, 879–80 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying § 17(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
139. In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying § 523(a)(15)); see also
Kolodziej v. Reines (In re Reines), 142 F.3d 970, 972–73 (1998) (applying § 523(a)(5)).
140. 310 F.3d. 308 (3d Cir. 2002).
141. Id. at 310.
142. Id.
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educational services, and that it [was] therefore tantamount to an
educational ‘loan’ that [was] excluded from discharge.”143
The Mehta court explored the creditor university’s regulations and
policies, including a guide given to all students upon registration that
bound students registered for classes to the school’s regulations and
policies.144 The regulations and polices obligated students to pay all
tuition, fees, and charges and included various remedies the university
could exercise to collect delinquencies.145 Part of the Mehta court’s
reasoning focused on the bankruptcy court opinion in Seton Hall v. Van
Ess (In re Van Ess),146 in which the bankruptcy court held that a student’s
delinquent tuition was dischargeable “because the exceptions to
discharge contained in § 523(a) ‘should be narrowly construed against
the creditor in order to carry out the rehabilitative policy of the
Bankruptcy Code.’”147 Speaking of Van Ess, the Mehta court noted that
“the contrary construction urged by the university there would have been
inconsistent with that liberal, rehabilitative policy” and that a debtor’s
“nonpayment of his tuition bill did not result in an extension of credit.”148
The Mehta court concluded that delinquent tuition, without more, was not
excepted from discharge and that it would “not now create a loan
agreement where none otherwise exists.”149 In finding the tuition debt
143. Id. at 312. The relevant part of § 523(a)(8) stated that a discharge:
[D]oes not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for an educational
benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit,
or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or
nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt from
discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and
the debtor’s dependents.
Id. at 310–11 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)).
144. Id. at 312.
145. Id. One of the creditor’s policies stated:
Boston University’s policy requires the withholding of all credit, educational
services, issuance of transcripts, and certification of academic records from any
person whose financial obligations to the University (including delinquent
student accounts, deferred balances, and liability for damages) are due and/or
unpaid. . . . By registering for any class in the University, each student accepts
and agrees to be bound by the foregoing University policy as applied to any
preexisting or future obligation to the University.
Id. at 312 n.5.
146. 186 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
147. Mehta, 310 F.3d at 315 (quoting In re Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 377–78).
148. Id. at 315 (quoting In re Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 378).
149. Id. at 316.
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was not a loan, the Mehta court quoted the fresh start canon twice.150
Overall, the circuit courts have applied the fresh start canon to
statutory text in at least ten of the nineteen subsections of § 523(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.151 The practice of using the fresh start canon to
interpret exceptions to discharge is widespread and unquestioned
throughout the circuit courts. But because canons are supposed to merely
provide guidance and are not mandatory rules, this practice should be
open to review.152
C. The Fresh Start Canon Should Not Be Used to Interpret Exceptions
to Discharge
Using the fresh start canon to interpret exceptions to discharge is
misguided for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has rejected use of
the fresh start canon in the exceptions to discharge context. Second, the
purpose and nature of exceptions to discharge makes the fresh start canon
an unsuitable interpretative tool.
1. The Supreme Court Has Rejected Use of The Fresh Start Canon to
Interpret Exceptions to Discharge
In stark contrast to the circuit courts, the Supreme Court does not use
the fresh start canon. It has repeatedly declined explicit invitations in
briefs to construe exceptions to discharge narrowly.153 Instead, it has a
“‘well-known’ guide”154 and “long-standing principle”155 that
“exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those plainly
150. Id. at 311, 316.
151. See supra Section II.B (identifying cases interpreting the language of § 523(a)(1), (2),
(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (15) and (19)).
152. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“[T]hese canons do not
determine how to read this statute. For one thing, canons are not mandatory rules. They are guides
that ‘need not be conclusive.’ They are designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent
as embodied in particular statutory language.” (citation omitted) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001))).
153. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. in Support of Petitioner at 12, Bullock
v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013) (No. 11-1518) (“The Court Should Construe
the Exceptions to the Discharge Narrowly to Effectuate the Bankruptcy Code’s Fresh Start
Policy.”); Brief for Petitioner at 29, Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998) (No. 96-1923)
(stating that “[g]iven the centrality of the fresh start policy to the purposes of the bankruptcy law
as applied to individuals, it follows that the nondischargeability provisions must be construed
narrowly” (citation omitted)); Brief of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (No. 97-115)
(containing an entire subsection of argument entitled “Exceptions To Discharge Should Be
Narrowly Construed”).
154. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (quoting Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558,
562 (1915)).
155. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760.
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expressed.’”156 The historical development of this approach and the
Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of narrow interpretations of
exceptions to discharge were explained earlier in Section I.B.
At first glance, one might mistake the two standards as being roughly
equivalent because the Supreme Court’s standard uses the word
“confine” and the circuit courts’ fresh start canon uses the word “narrow.”
That is not the case. There is a meaningful difference between confining
exceptions to discharge to those plainly expressed and construing them
narrowly. The verb “confined” indicates the placement of a limit,
boundary, or enclosure. The object being confined is not “those plainly
expressed,” meaning the words of the exceptions to discharge in § 523(a).
Rather, the object being confined is anything other than the plainly
expressed words of § 523(a). The scope or extent of the confinement is
“to” the plainly expressed words. This suggests the confining
construction does not apply to the plainly expressed words of § 523(a)—
it applies to anything other than the plainly expressed words. In contrast,
the object of the circuit courts’ narrow construction is the actual words of
§ 523(a). The focus of the Supreme Court’s standard ensures an
interpretation that is bounded “to” the plainly expressed words of
§ 523(a). The circuit courts’ focus in using the fresh start canon is on
making narrow inferences from the actual words of § 523(a). The
distinction is subtle but significant.
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the difference between
confining exceptions to discharge to those plainly expressed and
construing them narrowly. In 2010, the Supreme Court decided a case
involving exemptions under § 522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code. One party
argued that “procedures that burden the debtor’s exemption entitlements,
like those that impair a debtor’s discharge generally, are to be construed
narrowly.”157 The Supreme Court rejected this argument stating it
“miss[ed] the mark” and emphasized “the importance of limiting
exceptions to discharge ‘to those plainly expressed.’”158 In addition, the
outcome of a case completely changes depending on which standard is
applied. Subsection II.B.2 explored the Ritz case, where the Fifth Circuit
applied the fresh start canon to construe statutory language in favor of the
debtor.159 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit in Ritz drew pro-debtor inferences
by interpreting “actual fraud” to require a representation. When the
Supreme Court applied the plainly expressed standard to the same
156. Id. (quoting Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 62).
157. Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 790 n.17 (2010) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 33,
Schwab, 560 U.S. 770 (No. 08-538)).
158. Id. (quoting Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 62).
159. See supra Subsection II.B.2. (discussing Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787
F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016)).
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statutory language, the outcome changed. The Supreme Court interpreted
the term actual fraud “to encompass fraudulent conveyance schemes,
even when those schemes do not involve a false representation.”160
Admittedly, the “plainly expressed” standard is limited in its utility to
provide helpful guidance to courts seeking to interpret exceptions to
discharge. Like its related “plain meaning” cousin, the “notion that
because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is
merely pernicious oversimplification.”161 Consequently, it is appropriate
and in many cases necessary for a court, in applying the plainly expressed
standard, to use a variety of sources such as precedent, other parts of the
Bankruptcy Code, dictionaries, legislative history, maxims, and yes, even
textual and substantive canons, in order to determine the meaning of
statutory text.162 But one of these sources of guidance should not be
utilized in certain contexts. The Supreme Court has determined that it is
not appropriate for courts to use the fresh start canon to interpret
exceptions to discharge.
2. The Purpose and Nature of Exceptions to Discharge Makes the Fresh
Start Canon an Unsuitable Interpretative Tool
Exceptions to discharge serve a unique role in bankruptcy law,
especially in relation to the fresh start policy. The fresh start policy is
primarily accomplished through the discharge of debt. But using the fresh
start policy to delineate the limits of the discharge is circular and
compromises a rival public policy that is a critical component of
bankruptcy law. Indeed, the competing policy of the discharge
restrictions could be viewed as a condition imposed by society upon the
grant of a discharge. To understand the exceptions to discharge, one must
understand the nature of the discharge itself.
The “Bankruptcy Clause” of the Constitution authorizes Congress to
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.”163 Congress has intermittently used this authority to enact,
repeal, and amend various bankruptcy acts since the year 1800.164
160. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz) 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016).
161. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); see also
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 249 (1989) (involving both the majority and
dissenting opinions relying upon conflicting plain meanings of statutory text).
162. In other words, this Article is not contending that the “plainly expressed” standard is
the fix-all solution for courts struggling to apply exceptions to discharge. For example, in Bullock
the Supreme Court applied the “plainly expressed” standard in conjunction with several other
considerations, including the textual canon noscitur a sociis. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A.,
133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013).
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
164. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (amended in 1801 and 1802, then repealed
in 1803); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Bankruptcy Act of 1867,
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Discharge of debt is a selectively conferred privilege, not a fundamental
or constitutional right.165 The Supreme Court has characterized the
discharge as “a legislatively created benefit, not a constitutional one,
and . . . it was a benefit withheld, save for three short periods, during the
first 110 years of the Nation’s life.”166 Thus, “[t]here is no constitutional
right to obtain a discharge of one’s debts in bankruptcy.”167 In
corresponding fashion, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the
clear and convincing burden of proof was required to effectuate the fresh
start, and only requires creditors to prove exceptions to discharge by “the
ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard.”168
Instead of a constitutional right, “bankruptcy legislation is in the area
of economics and social welfare.”169 As such, Congress has shaped the
contours of the discharge to include at least two types of restrictions.
First, a discharge may be denied globally rendering all of a debtor’s debt
nondischargeable.170 Second, an identified, single indebtedness may be
excepted from discharge either because the nature of the debt itself is
important to society or the debt relates to a debtor’s wrongful conduct.171
Examples of important types of debt are those relating to taxes,172

ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed in
1978 after significant amendments); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (2012)); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
165. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (noting that “a debtor has no constitutional
or ‘fundamental’ right to a discharge in bankruptcy” (quoting United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,
445–46 (1973))); Napolitano v. McNamara (In re McNamara), 310 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2004) (“Bankruptcy is a privilege, not a right.”).
166. Kras, 409 U.S. at 447.
167. Id. at 446 (also stating that “[b]ankruptcy is hardly akin to free speech or marriage or to
those other rights, so many of which are imbedded in the First Amendment, that the Court has
come to regard as fundamental and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling
governmental interest before they may be significantly regulated”).
168. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286, 291 (1991) (“We are unpersuaded by the argument that the
clear-and-convincing standard is required to effectuate the ‘fresh start’ policy of the Bankruptcy
Code.”).
169. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012).
171. Id. § 523(a); see also Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222 (1998) (stating that “[t]he
various exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) reflect a conclusion on the part of Congress ‘that the
creditors’ interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweigh[s] the debtors’
interest in a complete fresh start’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Grogan, 498 U.S. at
287)); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964). An example of a debt that is important
to society is the public policy favoring the enforcement of familial obligations as contained in
§ 523(a)(5). See Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 1984).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
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domestic-support obligations,173 government fines,174 educational
loans,175 and orders of restitution in criminal cases.176
In addition, there is no discharge of debt arising from certain types of
reprehensible conduct by a debtor. This is the statutory implementation
of the fresh start policy’s “honest” but unfortunate debtor.177 For
example, there is no discharge for debts obtained by false pretenses or
actual fraud,178 defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,179
embezzlement,180 willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another,181
or death or injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a vehicle while the
debtor was intoxicated.182
The Supreme Court has recognized that the code section containing
the exceptions to discharge “is not a compassionate section for debtors.
Rather, it demonstrates congressional judgment that certain problems—
e.g., those of financing government—override the value of giving the
debtor a wholly fresh start.”183 In a later case, after discussing the
importance of the fresh start policy, the Supreme Court described the
interplay between the fresh start and exceptions to discharge:
[I]n the same breath that we have invoked this “fresh start”
policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits
the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new
beginning to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”
The statutory provisions governing nondischargeability
reflect a congressional decision to exclude from the general
policy of discharge certain categories of debts—such as
child support, alimony, and certain unpaid educational loans
and taxes, as well as liabilities for fraud. Congress evidently
concluded that the creditors’ interest in recovering full
payment of debts in these categories outweighed the debtors’
interest in a complete fresh start.184
173. Id. § 523(a)(5).
174. Id. § 523(a)(7).
175. Id. § 523(a)(8).
176. Id. § 523(a)(13).
177. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating the fresh start policy is
a “public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt” (emphasis added)).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
179. Id. § 523(a)(4).
180. Id.
181. Id. § 523(a)(6).
182. Id. § 523(a)(9).
183. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (applying § 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, the predecessor to the current § 523).
184. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (citation omitted).
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The circuit courts utilize the fresh start canon on the basis that it is
necessary to achieve the general beneficial purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code. Yet, the discharge restrictions policy underlying the exceptions to
discharge is just as much a part of the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code as
the fresh start policy. Congress defined the scope of the discharge by
outlining exceptions to discharge. Courts should not use the benefits of
the discharge as a basis for narrowly interpreting the exceptions to
discharge, because the exceptions confine the discharge itself. In other
words, overreliance upon the fresh start policy evolves into a selfexpanding discharge that squeezes out all but the most rare and egregious
cases involving the exceptions to discharge. The discharge restrictions
policy should not be overshadowed by the fresh start policy. The Supreme
Court has recognized this distinction, observing that “while it is true that
a finding of nondischargeability prevents a bankrupt from getting an
entirely ‘fresh start,’ this observation provides little assistance in
construing a section expressly designed to make some debts
nondischargeable.”185
However, under the same logic, courts interpreting exceptions to
discharge should not give lopsided treatment in favor of the discharge
restrictions policy by utilizing a broad construction. There is a narrow
circuit court line of authority applying a “broad” construction of the
exception to discharge in § 523(a)(5) for domestic-support obligations on
a public-policy basis.186 Many of these courts point to the 1904 Supreme
Court decision Wetmore v. Markoe,187 which was issued before the
Bankruptcy Code contained a statutory provision excepting domestic-

185. See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1978).
186. See Falk & Siemer, LLP v. Maddigan (In re Maddigan), 312 F.3d 589, 596 (2d Cir.
2002) (“[W]hen due regard is given for the other policy priorities with which Congress was
concerned in drafting the Bankruptcy Code, there is ample justification for construing certain
statutory terms broadly . . . . [A]mong the concepts to be given broad interpretation is the meaning
of ‘in the nature of support.’” (quoting Peters v. Hennenhoeffer (In re Peters), 133 B.R. 291, 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1991))); Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998)
(making a broad interpretation stating that even though § 523(a)(5) “applies on its face only to
debts owed ‘to’ a child or former spouse . . . [w]e hold in the instant case that the identity of the
payee is less important than the nature of the debt”); In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir.
1998) (stating “a § 523(a)(5) exception from discharge is construed more liberally than other
§ 523 exceptions”); Holliday v. Kline (In re Kline), 65 F.3d 749, 750–51 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating
that “[a]lthough statutory exceptions to discharge normally are subject to narrow construction,
exceptions from discharge for spousal and child support deserve a more liberal construction”
(citation omitted)); Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
“the term ‘support’ as used in § 523(a)(5) is entitled to a broad application”); Peters v.
Hennenhoeffer (In re Peters), 964 F.2d 166, 167 (2d Cir. 1992), aff’g, 133 B.R. 291, 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The ‘nature of support’ is a broadly construed term in bankruptcy law.”).
187. 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
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support obligations from discharge.188 Wetmore emphasized the
importance of domestic-support obligations to society and held:
Unless positively required by direct enactment the courts
should not presume a design upon the part of Congress in
relieving the unfortunate debtor to make the law a means of
avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral and legal,
devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to
maintain and educate his children.189
Despite the importance of the public policies manifested by the
discharge restrictions, courts should not construe any of the exceptions to
discharge broadly. Congress has balanced the tension between the fresh
start and the discharge restriction policies by carefully crafting through
compromise the statutory text of the exceptions to discharge, and “it is
not for courts to alter the balance struck by the statute.”190
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides a classic example of
when it is appropriate for courts to utilize a broad or narrow construction
of statutory language. Section 1-103 of the UCC is entitled “Construction
of UCC to Promote its Purposes and Policies.”191 It states that the UCC
must be “liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies . . . (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions.”192 This section is an express legislative direction
to construe statutory provisions in accordance with the stated substantive
public policies. The Official Comment explains:
The proper construction of the Uniform Commercial Code
requires, of course, that its interpretation and application be
limited to its reason.
...
The Uniform Commercial Code should be construed in
accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The
text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose
and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the
188. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
189. Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77.
190. Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1197–98 (2014) (interpreting exemption limits
contained in § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code).
191. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
192. Id. § 1-103(a).
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Uniform Commercial Code as a whole, and the application
of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as
the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and
policies involved.193
Unlike the UCC, the exceptions to discharge in the Bankruptcy Code
should not be construed narrowly or broadly, precisely because there are
competing purposes and policies involved. Section 102 of the Bankruptcy
Code is entitled “Rules of Construction.”194 In contrast to section 1-103
of the UCC, § 102 of the Bankruptcy Code does not contain substantive
public policies nor does it contain a legislative direction to construe
statutory provisions in accordance with substantive public policies.195
Instead, it contains grammatical interpretative guidance on the level of a
textual canon. For example, § 102(3) states: “‘includes’ and ‘including’
are not limiting” and § 102(5) states: “‘or’ is not exclusive.”196 The text
of the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a legislative direction to
construe statutory provisions in favor of any identified substantive public
policy. Accordingly, courts should not favor a broad or narrow
construction of the exceptions to discharge.
CONCLUSION
Circuit courts throughout the Nation are using bankruptcy law’s fresh
start policy as a substantive canon of construction to interpret exceptions
to discharge. They should immediately stop this practice. Likewise,
bankruptcy courts should not follow their respective circuit court’s
version of the fresh start canon. Regardless of whether the fresh start
canon is used as a presumption, a tiebreaker among competing
interpretations, or as a reason compelling a particular interpretive
outcome, courts should not apply it when interpreting the exceptions to
discharge. The purpose and nature of exceptions to discharge makes the
fresh start canon an unsuitable interpretative tool. In addition, the
Supreme Court has rejected the use of the fresh start canon to interpret
exceptions to discharge. Courts should not construe exceptions to
discharge narrowly or broadly. Instead, as the Supreme Court requires,
“exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those plainly
expressed.’”197 When courts seek to give meaning to what is plainly
193. Id. § 1-103 cmt. 1.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
195. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code is probably the most similar provision to section
1-103 of the UCC. Section 105(a) states that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” § 105(a).
196. Id. § 102.
197. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013) (quoting Kawaauhau
v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)).
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expressed in the exceptions to discharge, they should not utilize the fresh
start canon.

